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NOTES
The Pennsylvania State Authority Act
The scope of this note is confined to a discussion of the opinion of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, given on a rehearing of Kelly v. Earle,' determining the validity of the Pennsylvania State Authority Act. 2 Under the facts
in the original petition, the legislature created a public corporation known as the
General State Authority, empowered the Authority to purchase land from the
8
state, to construct improvements thereon, and to receive loans and grants. The
Authority planned to make improvements with money advanced by the federal
government. The improved land was then to be leased to the state for an amount
sufficient to pay operating expenses and liquidate the Authority's obligation to
the bondholders. At the end of thirty years, upon compliance with the contract,
the Authority was to deed the improved property to the state. The property was
subject to execution by the bondholders upon default in payment of rents. In a
four-to-three decision, the court held the State Authority Act unconstitutional, on
the ground that, since the land of the Authority was subject to execution, there
was a pledge of the general faith and credit of the state, so that the obligation conclusively was a debt.4 And since the land was deeded back to the state, the arrangement constituted a purchase of capital assets by installments, 5 the aggregate
of which exceeded the current revenue plus $i,ooo,ooo., and was therefore a debt
within the constitutional prohibition. 6
The petition for rehearing contained new and additional facts, including a
stipulation exempting the land of the state or the Authority from execution, and
a provision that title to the lands remain in the Authority at the expiration of the
leases. The petition emphasized that the expected current revenues would be
ample to pay the annual rentals. Further, it appeared here that the state was
to pay the rentals from a. fund made up almost entirely of compensation paid
by the several counties for their proportionate use of the new projects. 7
1. 320 Pa. 449, 182 AtI. 5oi (1936). Opinion on rehearing not yet reported. Pa. Sup. Ct.,
Jan. 30, 1937.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 71, § 1707.
3. The projects would be financed under the W. P. A., whereby forty-five per cent of the
total cost is paid as a gift by the federal administration, and the balance is advanced as a loan.
The Authority planned to solicit $6ooooooo.
4. When a state pledges property as security for a loan it is considered a debt of the
state, in the constitutional sense, because on default and execution the general assets of the
state are diminished, and thus, there is a burden on the people generally. Lesser v. Warren
Borough, 237 Pa. 5oi, 85 Atl. 839 (1912) ; Schuldice v. Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 28, 95 Atl. 938
(1915) ; see Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 85, I73 Atl. 289, 298 (934).
5. It is well settled in Pennsylvania that debt limitations cannot be avoided by purchasing
capital assets on installments, each of which would be within future current revenue, rather
than by paying a lump sum. Appeal of City of Erie, 91 Pa. 398 (879) ; Brown v. City of
Corry, 175 Pa. 528, 34 Atl. 854 (1896) ; McKinnon v. Mertz, 225 Pa. 85, 73 Atl. ioii (igo9).
6. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 4: "No debt shall be created by or on behalf of the State, except
to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, repel invasions, suppress insurrection, defend the
State in War, or to pay existing debt; and the debt created to supply deficiencies in revenue
shall never exceed in the aggregate at any one time, one million dollars." It is settled in
Pennsylvania that this provision prohibits indebtedness in excess of revenue collectible within
the biennial period, it being considered current revenue, plus one million dollars.
7. New facts were admitted on the rehearing because the Supreme Court had taken original jurisdiction.
(518)
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Upon rehearing, the court was unanimous in holding the obligations legal
on the amended record." It reasoned that the obligations were no longer a debt
within the constitutional prohibition because the new facts made the transaction
9
a lease for recurrent needs, rather than the purchase of a capital asset; and
secondly, that it was not a debt in the constitutional sense, because the obligation
was self-liquidating 10
The creation and use by the states of separate legal entities known as "author11
ities" to finance public improvements have grown rapidly in the last few years.
2
Thus, authorities have been created to finance low-rent housing projects,' and
their utilization has been upheld in programs of electrification and water6 conIn
servation,13 flood control programs, 14 toll bridges 15 and other projects.'
most of the "authority" cases the bonds have been secured solely by a pledge of
revenues from fees in the nature of service charges, and thus have been selfliquidating.' 7 But it should be noted that under this arrangement, except where
prohibited by peculiar constitutional provisions, the states could have created the
same obligations directly, for when an obligation is self-liquidating, it is not a
debt at all in the constitutional sense, and is therefore unaffected by limitations,
making the creation of an authority unnecessary. Thus the authority has not
occupied an important position, except for management purposes. However, the
Pennsylvania court in the instant decision has gone farther in enabling the state
to accomplish through the instrument of an authority what it dearly could not
accomplish directly. To liquidate its obligation, the Authority depended, not on
the service charges imposed on those receiving direct benefit from the improved
property, but on compensation in the form of rentals from the state, almost all
of which was acquired through increasing the tax burden.
Prior to this decision, the "lease for recurrent needs" doctrine had only been
used in Pennsylvania by municipalities, and never by the state. But the court
extended the doctrine to apply to leases of the state, pointing out that the purpose
8. It is interesting to note that one of the dissenting justices on the first hearing had become the Chief Justice in the interim between the hearings, and wrote the opinion of the court
upon the second hearing.
9.It is not disputed that in Pennsylvania a municipality may enter a lease for recurring
needs, provided the annual rentals do not exceed the debt limitation, despite the fact that the
aggregate of the rentals would exceed the limitation. Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa.

338 (875) ; Bailey v. Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594, 39 At. 494 (1898) ; Georges Township v.
Union Trust Co., 293 Pa. 364, 143 Atl. IO (1928). Cf. cases cited supra note 5. Thus a

municipality could lease a fire alarm system for ten years at $i,ooo. per year, where the
$i,ooo. would not exceed the limitation, although the aggregate of the rentals or the present
sale value would exceed it. But if the same municipality entered into a contract of purchase
for the fire alarm system, to be paid for in installments of $i,ooo. each, then it would be considered a capital acquisition and the installments would be considered in their aggregate. Thus
it would exceed the limitation.
Io. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 Ati. 289 (1934) ; California
Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7,21 P. (2d) 425 (x933) ; Bates v. State Bridge
Commission, O9 W. Va. 186, i53 S. E. 305 (930).
ii. See Foley, Low-Rent Housing and State Financing (937) 85 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 239,
253.

12. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1931-35) c. 67, §§ 60-78.
13. Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw, 125 Tex. 268, 83 S. W. (2d) 629

(935).
14. Clarke v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 177 S.C. 427, i81 S. E. 481 (I935).
15. California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425 (I933).
16. For a collection of laws creating authorities, see Foley, Revenue Financing of Public
Enterprises (1936) 35 MIcH. L. Rxv. I, 6.
17. Board of Regents v. Sullivan, 42 P. (2d) 61g (Ariz. 1935) ; California Toll Bridge
Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425 (1933) ; State eii rel. Miller v. State Bd. of
Educ., 56 Idaho 210, 52 P. (2d) 141 (1935) ; Caldwell Bros. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 176 La.
825, 147 So. 5 (I933) ; State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, Ioo Mont. 391, 47 P. (2d) 637 (935).
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of the Pennsylvania debt limitation was to keep expenditures within current
revenues, and that this purpose applied to state debts, as well as to municipal
debts. The court was unequivocal in holding the obligations legal on the rehearing, but it is submitted that other avenues of logic could have been as readily
followed.
The court could certainly have pierced the corporate veil and have
held that there is no real difference between the state and the Authority,"8 and
since the state could not lease to itself, and pay rents to itself, the arrangement
would be void. No stock was issued by the Authority, so that the interest would
lie in its creator, the state, thus emphasizing the identity of the two interests.
As indicated above, the only practical reason for declaring the Act unconstitutional on the first hearing was that the arrangement, whereby the land
would eventually be deeded back to the state, would, in reality, constitute a sale. 19
Under the new facts, the title was to remain in the Authority, and therefore it
was held a lease for recurring needs, and consequently a valid obligation. 20 But
it is of note that "although title was to remain in the Authority, the Authority
was to have existence as a corporation for just thirty-two years"; 21 thirty years
to liquidate the bonds, and two years to clean up its affairs. When the Authority goes out of existence, the lands and improvements must escheat to the state,
so that in either event title passes to the state. And in this case, where title
passed by deed, the obligation was forbidden; but where, by the device of not
executing a deed, it passed by escheat, the obligation was valid. This, again,
serves to emphasize the extent to which the court went to ignore reality.
It is further submitted that the court is inconsistent in giving to the Authority all the attributes of a separate and distinct legal entity, completely insulated
from its creator, in order that it could be a lessor to the state, but in refusing
at the same time, to completely insulate the Authority from the state for the
purpose of giving it plenary control over the land which it holds. Considering
the purpos6 of the Authority, there would seem to be no legal basis for giving
it complete insulation in one case, and not in the other. And if it is considered
a separate and distinct legal entity in both cases, it would follow logically that
the Authority could pledge such property if it chose to do so. The property
would no longer be that of the state; it would cease being state property when
deeded to the Authority. Yet the court was strong in its contention that the property must not be subject to execution.22
i8. Cf. Schuldice v. City of Pittsburgh, 25, Pa. 28, 32, 95 Atl. 938, 94o (,9,5), where it
was held that the device of having bonds issued by a bridge company, the stock of which was
owned by the city, did not avoid the charge that thereby the city's debt was increased. The
court said: "While it is true that the bridge company continued to exist as a corporate entity . . . yet the indebtedness of the bridge company became in effect the indebtedness of
the city, its real owner, even though there was no direct liability for the debt on the part of
the city." Accord: Point Bridge Co. v. Pittsburgh Rys., 240 Pa. IO5, 87 Atl. 614 (913).
The principal distinguishing feature is that in the instant case no stock was issued, but this
seems relatively unimportant in view of the creation by the state of the Authority, and in
view of the constituency of the Authority. The Act provides that the Governor, the state
treasurer, the auditor general, the secretary of internal affairs, the secretary of property and
supplies, the president pro tempore of the senate and their respective successors in office, and
two citizens of the state are "hereby created a body corporate constituting a public corporation and government instrumentality by the name of 'The General State Authority'." PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit. 71, § 1707-3.
ig. Appeal of Erie, 9I Pa. 398 (1879); Brown v. Corry, 175 Pa. 528, 34 Atl. 854 (1896);
McKinnon v. Mertz, 225 Pa. 85, 73 Atl. io2 (i9o9).
20. Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (875) ; Bailey v. Philadelphia, 284 Pa. 594, 39
Atl. 494 (1898) ; Georges Township v. Union Trust Co., 293 Pa. 364, 143 Atl. io (1928).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 71, § 1707-4a.
22. See Foley, Low-Rent Housing and State Financing (937)
85 U. OF PA. L. RE,.
239, 256.
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As a second ground for the decision, the court stated that the projects constructed with the borrowed money were self-liquidating, and that therefore the
obligations were not debts in the constitutional sense.23 From the very inception of constitutional debt limitations, it has been held that obligations incurred
for the construction of such projects as canals, 24 toll-bridges, 25 lighting plants, 26
and water systems 2 7 were not debts in the constitutional sense if payable from
a special fund, made up solely of revenues of the created project. Such obligations were not debts because the money used for repayment was not otherwise
available for general state purposes, and the obligation could never increase the
tax burden of the people generally.
The court was ambiguous by failing to state in what respect the obligations
were self-liquidating. There are three possibilities. The court might have used
"self-liquidating" in the sense adopted at the first hearing, that the
obligations
were payable solely from the revenue of fees or service charges imposed for the
use of the facility created, thus imposing no tax burden on the people generally. In other words, it would be the obligation of the state, payable solely from
service charges for the use of the thing created with the borrowed money, such
as the financing of toll bridges by pledging the tolls. If it is assumed that the
court had this view in mind, then the objections made by the court on the original
hearing may be repeated here, namely, that "In so far as such projects are permitted by the Tranter 28 case [permits self-liquidating obligations], no valid
objection to them could be founded upon section 4 of article IX [limitation provision]. But it must be obvious that the nature of most of the projects envisaged
excludes the possibility of self-liquidation. So far as those projects are concerned, the Tranter case offers no support." 29
As a second possibility, the court might have meant that the state's contractual obligation to pay annual rentals to the Authority for the leased improvements was self-liquidating, in that these rentals were to be payable solely from
a special fund made up of compensation paid by the several counties to the extent that they use the improvements, plus the slight contributions made by patients or relatives directly, in the case of state hospitals, who are financially able
to pay. There was apparently no stipulation restricting the state, in paying the
rentals, to compensation from counties or patients, but the court takes for granted
that this restriction exists. The existence of such an agreement would seem
to be a requisite to the validity of the debt in the arrangement under consideration, for it is of the essence of the special fund doctrine that payments be made
only from the special fund. But a stronger objection can be made. Under the
true "self-liquidation" or "special fund" doctrine, the revenues making up the
fund were always in the nature of service charges, such as tolls, or water and
electricity rents; the very basis of the doctrine was that the people generally
:23. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 Atl. 289 (1934) ; California
Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425 (1933) ; Evans v. Holman, 244 Ill.
596, 91 N. E. 723 (igio) ; Klein v. Louisville, 224 Ky. 624, 6 S. W. (2d) 11o4 (1928).
24. In re Canal Certificates, ig Colo. 63, 34 Pac. 274 (1893).
25. Klein v. Louisville, 224 Ky. 624, 6 S. W. (2d) 1104 (1928).
26. Evans v. Holman, 244 Ill. 596, 9i N. E. 723 (191o).
27. Winston v. Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 41 Pac. 888 (1895).
28. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 85, 173 Atl. 289, 298 (1934). (A
statute authorizing a public corporation to take over highway tubes for the purpose of making
self-liquidating improvements with federal aid and authorizing the corporation to pledge the
revenue, in the form of tolls, of the highway tubes, was held valid as not creating a debt of
the county in the constitutional sense. The court stated: "The bondholders cannot call on the
public treasuries to contribute; no county or municipal property can be taken for the debt,
because the bondholders have agreed to look to a special fund for payment, to be raised in the
manner provided.")
29. Kelley v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 461, i82 Atl. 501, 5o6 (1936).
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and that funds otherwise
would not be subjected to an increased tax burden,
30
But through the agency of
available for general purposes would not be used.
the county the very foundation of the "self-liquidation" doctrine is contravened; in saying that the source of the receipt of revenue is immaterial, the
court would seem to be disregarding reality.
A third possibility, is that the obligation of the Authority to pay bondholders was considered self-liquidating because payable from a special fund made
up solely of rentals paid by the state. The court cited the Tranter31 case as its
precedent, and in that case it was the obligation of the Authority, and not the
county, which was self-liquidating. Therefore, it is a fair inference that in the
instant case the court was considering the obligation of the Authority, and not
of the state. If this is true, then the court's discussion of "self-liquidating"
obligations was superfluous. If it was the obligation of the separate legal entity,
it should make no difference how it was liquidated. The fact that the Authority's
debt was self-liquidating simply described its method of financing, and logically
had no effect upon the validity of the state's obligation.
In refusing to look behind the entity, known as the Authority, and in giving
it the effect of a corporate body separate and distinct from the state, the court
was enabled to bring the case within the "lease for recurring needs" doctrine.
To attain this result, it was necessary to ignore the precedent whereby Pennsylvania courts have refused to give similar effect to public corporations organized
for substantially the same purpose, i. e., of avoiding debt limitations. It was
necessary to overlook the identity and effect between deeding land to the state,
and revesting title in the state by escheat. Further, the court was compelled to
disregard the identity of interest between the state and the Authority. It is
apparent that the most forceful argument of the court was the economic justification for taking advantage of the very favorable contracts offered under the
W. P. A. to meet unemployment problems and to share proportionately with
other states the bounties of the federal government. Although the result was,
perhaps, desirable under the circumstances, the precedent opens wide the doors
to extravagance and waste, the very effect which the limitations were designed
to prevent.
R.L.T.
The Situs of Stock for the Purpose of Attachment
Although this field of law has been ably dealt with several times in the past,'
the confusion which continues unabated, and the increase in the number of
3o. Thus in the Tranter case the court sustained the self-liquidating obligations because:
"The bondholders cannot call upon the public treasuries to contribute." And in In re Senate
Resolution No. 2, 94 Colo. 101, 31 P. (2d) 325 (1933), where the special fund was to be made
up of excise revenues, designated by the legislature to make up the fund, the court said that
a debt in the constitutional sense would be created, since the statute allocated to the payment
of the debt neither anticipated revenues from an improvement or industry created by the act,
nor even revenue from a source first tapped by the statute, but revenue already provided in
past years and at present flowing into the state treasury. But cf. Johnson v. McDonald, 97
Colo, 324, 49 P. (2d) 1017 (1935). In the absence of peculiar constitutional provisions, it
appears that the real test is whether the state generally, in the broad sense of placing any tax
burden on its people, is obligated to pay, or whether the repayments are to be made out of a
self-liquidating project without aid from taxation. If the funds for repayment are to come
from the people through any sort of burden that will burden the people generally, there arises
a general obligation to repay.
31. See supra note 28.

i. Pomerance, The Situs of Stock (i93i) 17 CORN. L. Q. 43, 62; Notes (1926) i5
L. REV. 145, (1925) 9 MINN. L. REV. 661.
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states which have adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, make it not unwise
to attempt once more an analysis of an apparently obscure subject.
The recent efforts of Mr. Coty's creditors to subject his shares in Coty, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation, to the satisfaction of their claims is an excellent illustration of the problem involved. One Cotnareanu commenced an action against
Coty in New York and levied an attachment against certain of his certificates of
stock in Coty, Inc., by serving the warrant with notice of levy on New York
banks which had possession of the certificates. A few months thereafter Woods,
another creditor of Coty, commenced an action at law against Coty in Delaware
and levied an attachment against the same shares of stock represented by the
certificates by serving notice of the attachment on the resident agent of the corporation in Delaware, the domicile of the corporation. Each of these attachments was sufficient under the law of the particular forum to subject at least2
some part of Coty's interest in the corporation to the jurisdiction of that forum.
It is within the scope of this note to determine what interest was subject to the
power of each court, and, as between the two, which court actually had jurisdiction to determine and control the ownership of the shares.
The decisions concerning the situs of shares for the purpose of attachment
may readily be classified into three views: (i) That the share is located only
at the domicile of the corporation, the state of incorporation, and consequently
that state alone has jurisdiction over the share, the certificate being merely evidence of the fact of ownership of shares and not attachable property; (2) That
the share is located at the domicile of the corporation, but for the purpose of
attachment the corporation is domiciled in the state in which it has its principal
place of business; as under the first view, the certificate is not such property
that it may be attached; (3) That although the share exists at the domicile of
the corporation, still the stock certificate, by virtue of its commercial value, is
property and may be attached wherever found.
The first view has been adopted by the majority of states.8 It is based on
the reasoning that a share is an interest in the general enterprise undertaken by
the association, and that therefore it is so intimately connected with the association that it exists only where the association is legally domiciled. Inasmuch as
a share is merely an aggregate of rights and duties, it is almost a misuse of terms
to say that it has a situs at any one place. 4 However, courts have given the share
a location at various places for different purposes,5 and for the particular purpose of attachment they have designated its situs to be at the state of incorporation. The corollary to this first theory is that the share certificate is merely a
convenient form of evidence of the ownership of a certain number of shares and
as such is not "property", nor even an "interest in property", which may be
attached under the usual attachment statute. 6
The second rule is merely a practical extension of the first. The courts
applying this rule refuse to permit the concept of corporate domicile at the place
of incorporation to take precedence over the reality of corporate domicile at the
2. Woods v. Spoturno, 183 At. 319 (Del. 1936); Cotnareanu v. Woods, 155 Misc. 95,
278 N. Y. Supp. 589 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
3. Gundry v. Reakirt, 173 Fed. 167 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 19o9) ; Pinney v. Nevills, 86 Fed.
97 (C. C. D. Mass. 1898) ; Dupont v. Moore, 86 N. H. 254, 166 At. 417 (1933) ; Christmas
v. Biddle, 13 Pa. 223 (i85o); B. & A. Drilling Co. v. Norton, 20 S. W. (2d) 413 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929). At common law not even a share in a domestic corporation could be reached by
attachment process because of the peculiar nature of a share. Denton v. Livingston, 9 Johns.
96 (N. Y. 1812) ; Trust Co. v. Weaver, lO2 Tenn. 66, 50 S. W. 763 (1899).
4. See Pomerance, supra note i, at 45, 46.
5. See infra note 21.
6. Pinney v. Nevills, 86 Fed. 97 (C. C. D. Mass. 1898) ; Dupont v. Moore, 86 N. H. 254,
z66 AtI. 417 (1933) ; Christmas v. Biddle, 13 Pa. 223 (i85o).
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principal place of business.7 This view has much to recommend it, since it is
the merest fiction to say that a corporation is domiciled in state X merely because it was incorporated there (for reasons best known to the promoters)
although it carries on all its business, internal and external, in state Y. However, the mere fact that a corporation is licensed to do business within the state
is uniformly held not to be sufficient to bring the corporate shares within the
jurisdiction of the licensing state.$
The third view is inconsistent with the others primarily in attributing intrinsic value to the certificate itself, for the principal reason that business men
treat certificates of stock as property for all practical purposes. 9 Therefore, some
courts have concluded that stock certificates are embraced within the terms of
statutes providing for the attachment or garnishment of property belonging to
the defendant and in his or a third person's possession. 10 An adoption of this
rule necessarily implies that the law of the state in which the certificate is present
governs the transfer of the certificate, and this has been so held by the United
States Supreme Court in the leading case of Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft
v. United States Steel Corporation.- However, even though that case enunciates
the law as to the transfer of the certificate, the transfer of the share itself is
necessarily governed by the law of the corporate domicile, since it has been held
by the same courts that 1apply
the above rule that the share is within the jurisdic2
tion of that state alone.
Inasmuch as some states have made stock certificates negotiable to the
extent that a delivery of a properly endorsed certificate constitutes the transferee
the owner of the shares, it may be said that in some cases the effect of an exercise of jurisdiction over the certificate is equivalent to the exercise of jurisdiction
over the actual shares.' 3 It is probably this fact which has lead the American
Law Institute to formulate the following rule:
"To the extent to which the law of the state in which the corporation
was incorporated embodies the share in the certificate, the share is subject
to the jurisdiction of the state which has jurisdiction over the certificate." :4
7. Wait v. Kern River Mining & Milling Co., 157 Cal. i6, IO6 Pac. 98 (ipog); Dean
Rapid Tel. Co. v. Howell, 162 Mo. App. IOO, 144 S. W. 135 (1909).
8. Daniel v. Gold Hill Mining Co., 28 Wash. 4H1, 68 Pac. 884 (I9O2). However, if the
corporation has become domesticated by force of a local statute, the shares are within the
jurisdiction of the local courts. Bowman v. Breyfogle, I45 Ky. 443, 140 S. W. 694 (911);
Young v. South Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 2 S. W. 202 (1886).
9. Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896 (i9oo) (certificates are sold in open market, transferred as collateral security for loans, etc.).
io. Mitchell v. Leland Co., 246 Fed. IO3 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Baar v. Smith, 97 Cal.
App. 400, 275 Pac. 86i (1929) ; Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Mather, 6o Minn. 362, 62 N.
W. 396 (i895) ; People ex tel. Wynn v. Grifenhagen, 167 App. Div. 572, 152 N. Y. Supp. 679
(1st Dep't, 1915) ; General Motors Corp. v. Ver Linden, ig App. Div. 375, 192 N. Y. Supp.
28 (1st Dep't, 1922) ; see 2 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) 16og. For the general
proposition that a stock certificate is property see ii FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS
(Perm. ed. 1932) § 5093.
II. 267 U. S. 22 (1925), aff'g, 30o Fed. 741 (S. D. N. Y. 1924) ; Pilger v. U. S. Steel
Corp., 102 N. J. Eq. 5o6, 141 AtI. 737 (1928) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (I934) § 53,
comment b; see Notes (1926) 15 CALIF. L. REv. 145, (1925) ) MINN. L. REv. 661. Contra:
Hunt v. Drug, Inc., 35 Del. 332, 156 Atl. 384 (931).
12. Black v. Zacharie, 44 U. S. 483 (1845); United Cigarette Machine Co. v. Canadian
Pac. Ry. Co., 12 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); 12 FLETrCHn, op. cit. supra note 1O, § 5473;
see Henley v. Myers, 215 U. S. 373, 383 (i9io).
13. Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft, 267 U. S. 22 (1925) is an example of this. The
New Jersey law was that an indorsement in blank and delivery of the certificate transferred
title to the shares. Therefore, a lawful seizure of a certificate, indorsed in blank, in England
had the effect of making the holder the owner of the shares evidenced by the certificate.
14. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 53 (3). See Note (1926) I5 CALIF. L.
REv. 145, in which the writer adopted this view.
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Under a reasonable interpretation of this rule the state which has jurisdiction of
the certificate has jurisdiction of the share to the extent to which the state of
incorporation has made a transfer of the certificate equivalent to a transfer of the
share. Construing the rule in this fashion, it is submitted that it goes too far
and is not justified by the decisions of the courts. If the rule were to be applied,
a certificate to which the state of incorporation has imparted the utmost negotiability would carry with it the share itself, and the situs of the share would be
coexistent with the physical location of the certificate; yet this is not so. In
Direction der Disconto-GeselIschaft v. United States Steel Corporation the
court, although admitting that the transfer of the certificate was governed by the
law of England, spoke of the "paramount power" I- of the United States and
apparently approved of the decision in Miller v. Kahwirke Aschersleben AktienGesellschaft where it was said:
"A seizure of the certificate, which may be in one state or county, is not
a seizure of the stock, the situs of which may be in another. That the situs
of stock is at the domicile of the corporation, and that it makes no difference
that the certificate of the stock may physically be elsewhere, is the rule in
federal courts." 16
Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals held in Holmes v. Camp ' 7 that,
despite the importance which is attributed to the certificate, the share itself is
located at the domicile of the corporation and is property belonging to the shareholder within the state. In the face of this and other authority, 8 it is impossible
to conclude that the physical presence of a "negotiable" certificate confers jurisdiction of the share itself, unless it be said that a share in a corporation is so
unique an interest that it may have a situs in two places at one and the same
time for the same purpose, 9 and such an extreme result is neither desirable nor
necessary. Undoubtedly, the rule appearing in the Restatement is a good practical solution of the problem, and, if universally adopted, would have the effect
of doing away with all conflict. However, since the general conception is that
the share actually exists only at the corporation's domicile, it is highly improbable that the Restatement rule will be adopted. Thus it would only be stultification
to sponsor the rule, especially since the same satisfactory result may be obtained
15. Although this reference to the paramount power of the United States in the opinion

by Justice Holmes is somewhat ambiguous, he was no doubt referring to the situation pre-

sented by Judge Hand in these words: "Again I have nothing to do with the power of the
United States to capture these shares, notwithstanding a prior capture in England; that is, I
need not say whether, if the local sovereign lays his hand upon the corporation, he should
prevail over similar action taken elsewhere against the shareholder." Direction der DiscontoGesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., 300 Fed. 741, 743 (S. D. N. Y. 1924), aft'd, 267 U. S. 22
(925).
16. 283 Fed. 746, 755 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
17. 219 N. Y. 359, 114 N. E. 841 (x916). This case concerned the right to serve a nonresident defendant by publication in a suit involving the title to shares in a domestic corporation; the defendant being the owner of the shares and the certificate being outside of the state.
The court determined that the shares were property within the state, and therefore service by
publication was proper under a statute permitting such service in actions quasi in ren. No
distinction was made between situs for this purpose and situs for the purpose of attachment.
See also Jellineck v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. I (1900).
iS. Harvey v. Harvey, 29o Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923).
19. Of course, for a different purpose stock may have a different situs. Thus, the situs
of stock for the purpose of taxation is at the domicile 6f the owner. First Nat. Bank of
Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932). In the field of administration of a decedent's estate
the same confusion as to the situs of stock forming a part of the estate exists as in the field
under discussion with the majority treating the stock as assets at the place of incorporation.
See Goodrich, Problems of Foreign Administration (1926) 39 HARv. L. Rxv. 797, 8o5; and
see cases collected in 72 A. L. L 179 (i3i).
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in the great majority of cases by maintaining the share's situs at the corporation's
domicile and permitting the state in which the certificate is located to adjudge
the ownership of the certificate.
In the light of the foregoing principles the apparent conflict between the
Delaware and New York attachments of Coty's interest in Coty, Inc., is necessarily resolved in favor of the Delaware attachment, for that proceeding subjected the shares themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, whereas the New
York attachment conferred upon the court jurisdiction of the certificate only,
the exercise of which jurisdiction could affect the share merely by indirection.
The New York court recognized the inferiority of its position and made it one
of the grounds for enjoining the plaintiff in the Delaware action from continuing the proceedings. 20 Nor would the result in this particular conflict be
altered by an adoption of the Restatement rule, since Delaware has declared
except taxation,
that for the purpose of attachment and for all other purposes
2
the situs of shares in a Delaware corporation is in Delaware. '
The Effect of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
This act, at present part of the statute law of twenty-five states,22 has for
its avowed purpose the making of the certificate, to the fullest extent possible,
the representative of the shares.23 With regard to the attachment of shares this
purpose has been effectuated by providing that no attachment of shares for which
there is an outstanding certificate shall be valid unless either (a) the certificate
is actually seized, or (b) it is surrendered to the corporation, or (c) its transfer
by the holder is enjoined.2 4 Further, the corporation cannot be compelled to
issue a new certificate until the old one is surrendered to it.25
Before entering into an examination of the significance of these provisions
it is necessary to point out that the word "certificate" as used in the act means
only certificates issued by corporations incorporated in states where the act is in
2
Thus, in Cherkasky v. Pride
force 26 and issued after the act has taken effectY.
a Pennsylvania court refused to sustain an attachment of certificates of stock in
a Delaware corporation on the ground that, although the act was in force in
Pennsylvania, Delaware had not adopted it.2

A situation, the converse of that presented in the above case, has not yet
arisen; that is, an attempt to attach in a state in which the Act is not in force a
certificate which has been issued in a state which had adopted the act. Of course,
if the state in which the attachment took place was one which had previously
attributed sufficient value to the certificate to treat it as attachable property, there
is no problem. Moreover, even if the state were one which, prior to the consideration of such a situation, had not looked upon stock certificates in so
realistic an attitude, the result might well be in favor of the validity of the
attachment on either one of two grounds: (a) that the certificate has become of
2o. Cotnareanu v. Woods, 155 Misc. 95, 97, 278 N. Y. Supp. 589, 592 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
The injunction was based on the theory that the defendant was seeking to attain an inequitable
advantage under the laws of another state. See Pound, The Progress of the Law-Equity
(2920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 420, 425, for a discussion of this ground as a basis for an injunction.
21. REV.

CODE

DEL. (1935), c. 65, § 2048.

22. 6 U. L. A. (Supp. 1935) 5.
23. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT, § I,

Commissioners' Note.

24. Id. at § 13.
25.

Ibid.

26. Id. at § 22; Casto v. Wrenn, 255 Mass. 72, 15o N. E. 898 (1925) ; Rand v. Hercules

Powder Co., 129 Misc. 891, 223 N. Y. Supp. 383 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
27. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 23; Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S.
Steel Corp., 30o Fed. 741 (S. D. N. Y. 1924), aff'd, 267 U. S. 22 (1925).
28. IO D. & C. 133 (Pa. 1928).

NOTES

such increased value by virtue of the qualities imparted to it by the act that it
has ceased to be merely evidence of title and has become property; or (b) that
the act has caused the situs of the share to be transferred from the domicile of
the corporation to whatever place the certificate happens to be. The weakness
of the second ground has already been indicated, and there is, in addition, the
objection that substantial authority has held that the Act does not effect the situs
of shares issued under it. 2 9 Thus, in Harvey v. Harvey " it was necessary, in
court, to determine the situs of
order to sustain the jurisdiction of the lower
3
certain shares in a Wisconsin corporation. ' It was argued that the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, which was in force in Wisconsin, had the effect of fixing
the situs of shares at the residence of their owner. In rejecting this argument
the court stated:
"It may be true that the statute mentioned tends to give to shares of stock
qualities partaking of those of commercial paper, but we do not agree that
the effect of the statute is to change the situs of the shares, or to deprive the
courts of Wisconsin from exercising jurisdiction over stock in a Wisconsin
corporation owned by nonresidents." 32
On the other hand the first possible ground upon which an attachment could
be supported, has the strength of sound common sense behind it. A certificate
which, if properly indorsed and delivered, carries with it complete ownership of
a share is property in both a legal and non-legal sense of the word. Certainly,
anything which the public considers as having considerable value by itself should
be looked upon as property by a court, especially if it is capable of seizure and
sale as a certificate is. Undoubtedly, any court desirous of changing its concept
of the nature of stock certificates so as to permit their attachment will find useful
material in the terms of the Act.
When the circumstances are such that the certificate cannot be seized, the
transAct has provided that the holder of the certificate may be enjoined from
83
That
ferring it, and such an injunction will have the force of an attachnent.
this remedy may be even more certain, section 14 provides that a creditor whose
debtor is the owner of a certificate shall be entitled to all possible aid from courts
of appropriate jurisdiction. However, since the act specifies that it is the holder
who is to be enjoined from transferring the certificate, an injunction restraining
the corporation from permitting a transfer of the shares on its books does not
operate as an attachment.' 4 This conclusion is a necessary one not only from
29. Harvey v. Harvey, 29o Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923) ; McQuillen v. National Cash
Register Co., 13 F. Supp. 53 (D. C. Md. 1935); Warren v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 116 N. J.
Eq. 315, 173 Atl. 128 (1934); cf. Newell v. Tremont Lumber Co., I61 La. 649, 1o9 So. 344
(1926) (for the purpose of taxation).
3o. 29o Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923).
31. This case arose under section 57 of the Judicial Code [18 STAT. 472 (1875), 28 U. S.
C. A. § i18 (1927)] which provides that when any action is brought in any district court to
determine the title to property within the district, absent defendants may be joined by publication. This action involved rights in stock in a corporation domiciled in the district. The certificate was outside of the district and so were several of the defendants. The principal contention of the defendants was that there was no property within the district. Thus, the same
problem is involved as in attachment proceedings-both being quasi in rein. The courts have
recognized this and cite the cases interchangeably.
32. 29o Fed. 653, 659 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923).
33. UNIFORM STOcK TRANSFER AcT § 13.

34. Bloch-Daneman Co. v. Mandelker & Son, 205 Wis. 641, 238 N. W. 831 (1931). A
fortliori mere service of notice on the corporation is not an attachment when the holder of the
certificate has not been enjoined. American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Kasco Mills, 262 N. Y.
585, 188 N. E. 75 (1933).
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the terms of the act but also for the purpose of insuring the negotiable value of
the certificate.8 5
In this respect Warren v. New Jersey Zinc Company "I is highly relevant.
In that case the New Jersey Chancellor sustained the validity of an injunction
restraining a nonresident from transferring the certificate of shares in a domestic
corporation on the ground that the res was within the jurisdiction of the court,
and that the injunction was effective because the person enjoined knew of the
injunction. Although there is some authority for the effectiveness of a decree
issued against a nonresident but affecting property within the jurisdiction of the
court, 37 such a principle is not applicable herein, since the res is not the shares

which were held to be in New Jersey, but the certificate which was in New
York. 38 The decision is to be deplored since the act necessarily contemplated
only an effective injunction as an attachment.3 9 Otherwise, the value of a certificate as a commercial instrument might be impaired, and thus the purpose of
the act defeated.
Conclusion
For the purpose of attachment the situs of a share is in the state of incorporation, the legal domicile of the corporation. The weight of authority behind
this rule is so great that to seek to supplant it at this late date would be of little,
if any, effect. On the other hand the growing acceptance of the certificate as
paper of considerable commercial value should, and probably will, lead more
courts to look upon the certificate as property which may be attached. Ordinarily
an attachment and sale of a certificate will constitute the transferee the owner of
the share, since under the law of the state in which the attachment took place he
is the lawful owner of the certificate, and this is usually sufficient to make him
the owner of the share. However, any conflict resulting from simultaneous
attachments at the corporate domicile and at the place where the certificate is
present must be resolved in favor of the attachment at the domicile, since in
that proceeding the court has jurisdiction of the shares themselves. The Uniform
Stock Transfer Act has not changed the actual situs of the share, but it has imparted such added value to the certificate, by increasing its negotiability, that
it is property within the meaning of attachment statutes.
E. R. von S.
35. An injunction restraining the corporation from transferring the shares on its books
would not prevent th transfer of the certificate to an innocent person, nor, in fact, would
enjoining the holder from transferring the certificate necessarily have that effect, but, at least,
it is more likely to restrain the transfer.
36. 116 N. J. Eq. 315, 173 Atl. 128 (1934).
37. See 5 PomERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 19o5) § 15.
38. The bad effect of this decision was ameliorated by the fact that before the proceedings were culminated all the parties in interest, including the nonresident holder of the certificate, appeared before the court.
39. See Amm v. Amm, 117 N. J. Eq. 185, 175 Atl. 186 (1934), where the court went out
of its way to say that an injunction restraining a nonresident from transferring his certificate
was not within the contemplation of the act.

